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For those who teach and write about insurance law, few cases have everything. But Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.' comes close: a mysterious death by gunshot near the railroad tracks in South Dakota, the deceased
having applied for but not yet been issued life insurance; a suit for coverage by
the deceased's mother; a glimpse into the inner operations and marketing
incentives of life insurance companies; a decision of the famous United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, by a classic panel composed of
Learned and Augustus Hand and Charles Clark; an opinion by Learned Hand,
and a concurrence by Clark; a fascinating, close reading of technical insurance
language; two fundamentally different perspectives on the role of courts in the
resolution of insurance coverage disputes; concerns about federalism; and
tributaries of implication running in so many directions that a large part of a
course on insurance law could be taught out of Gaunt alone. As the saying
goes, it doesn't get any better than this.
I.

THE FACTS

After two preliminary interviews with an insurance agent, Gaunt signed an
application for life insurance on August 3rd. The policy for which Gaunt
applied apparently provided "double indemnity" for "accidental death." What
year all this happened is uncertain. We never learn much about Gaunt - not his
first name, not his age, not the amount of the insurance, not the year that the
events at issue took place. Learned Hand's opinion gives us everything he
thinks we need to know, and nothing - absolutely nothing - more. Given the
year of the decision - 1947 - the fact that Gaunt died within months of signing
his application, and the opinion's reference to his "4F classification" in the
draft, we can infer that these events occurred sometime in the early to mid1940s. And from the fact that the judgment ultimately rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, Rhoda S. Gaunt, suing as Gaunt's beneficiary, was for $15,000 and
that the double-indemnity claim failed, almost certainly this was the face
amount of the policy.
With his application, Gaunt paid the full first premium. For reasons I will
indicate below, this was probably a monthly premium, though it might have
been a quarterly or annual one. Gaunt was given a copy of the application
(which had been written by the insurer) and a receipt. The application (and
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perhaps the receipt as well, although this is not clear) included the following
language:
If the first premium or installment thereof above stated was paid when this application was signed, and if the Company is satisfied that on the date of the completion of
Part B of this application I was insurable in accordance with the Company's rules for
the amount and on the plan applied for without modification, and if this application,
including said Part B, is, prior to my death, approved by the Company at its Home
Office, the insurance applied for shall be in force as of the date of completion of said
Part B .... 2
"Part B" was the form that covered the necessary medical examination. In
effect, therefore, the application provided that Gaunt would be covered from
the date he passed the medical examination, if he was insurable under the Company's rules on that date and the application was approved before he died.
Sounds good, right? Don't be so sure. Suppose the applicant dies after he
passes the medical exam but before the Company approves the application?
Apparently there is no coverage, because the application has not been approved
prior to the applicant's death. And this is so whether the Company learns of the
death and declines to approve the application, or approves the application and
then learns of the death. Either way, the application was not approved "prior to
my [i.e., the applicant's] death."
"True," you may say, "but if the applicant is alive when the application is
approved then he gets coverage retroactive to the date he passed the medical
exam." But what good is that? If he is still alive, he does not need backdated
coverage. And as we have just seen, if he is already dead, then he does not get
it.
That was the fix Gaunt was in upon signing the application. Subsequent
events fed right into the double-bind the application created. Gaunt passed his
medical exam, and the favorable report was submitted to the Home Office on
August 9th. As the report revealed that Gaunt had been declared "4F" in the
draft because he had poor eyesight, the Home Office required another medical
exam. This was submitted on August 19th, further inquiry ensued, and the
application was approved from a medical standpoint on the 26th, though not
finally approved, for on that same day the Home Office received news of
Gaunt's death. The trial court found, however, that if Gaunt had lived, the
Company would have approved his application. 3
Two days after his second medical exam on August 17th, Gaunt left
Waterbury, Connecticut, to seek work on the Pacific Coast or in Alaska. He
arrived in Chicago on the 21 st; on the 24th he reached Montevideo, Minnesota,
where he was seen traveling in an "army bus" that had been loaded on a flat car
of a west-bound train. The only other occupant of the bus was someone named
Rasch. On the 25th, Gaunt's body was found dead beside the west-bound track
of the railroad at Milbank, South Dakota, with a bullet hole in his head. There
was blood inside and outside the bus, and the bullet that had killed Gaunt was
found inside the bus. The murder weapon was never found.
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Gaunt died no later than the 25th. Consequently, even if Gaunt's application had been approved on the 26th, under the terms of the application he
would not have been covered, because the application would not have been
approved prior to his death. Gaunt was precisely the kind of applicant for
whom the promise to make coverage retroactive to the date of his medical
exam was illusory.

II.
A.

THE CLASH OF THE TITANS

Hand's Opinion for the Court

There were two questions:

whether Gaunt was covered at all, and

whether, if he was covered, his death was "accidental" and entitled him to
double indemnity. The second question was the easier one. The trial court
found that Rasch had killed Gaunt, and that the killing was not accidental.4
The evidence supported this finding. No gun was found near Gaunt, and there
was blood in the bus. So it was probable that Rasch shot Gaunt, and then
removed the body from the bus. The possibility that Rasch had pulled out his
revolver, accidentally shot Gaunt, and then dragged the body out of the bus
onto the side of the tracks and fled was not likely, and in any event was not the
only reasonable finding. The trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous and
was affirmed.
The central question, therefore, was the legal significance of the application provision purporting to condition coverage on the applicant's being alive at
the time of final approval. Hand began by acknowledging that, read literally,
this provision stated a condition precedent to coverage. What then was the
meaning of the provision indicating that if the insured were alive on the date of
approval, he would be covered as of the date of the medical exam? Anyone
still alive when the application was approved received no apparent benefit from
being covered earlier, and anyone not alive was not covered. The insurer suggested, however, that in fact there were six advantages to the applicant from
being "covered" earlier. These included the fact that the policy would become
incontestable sooner and that cash surrender value would mature earlier.5
Hand did not deny that these benefits would accrue to the successful applicant. But he thought that few applicants would understand the wording of the
application to mean that benefits such as this would only become available
earlier if the applicant were still alive at the time of approval. To require that
people unfamiliar with insurance language so understand the application was
"unpardonable." Rather, said Hand, the typical applicant "would assume that
he was getting immediate coverage for his money." Such an interpretation,
Hand admitted, did "some violence" to the language of the application, making
actual "approval" while the applicant was alive a condition precedent. But it
did "greater violence" to this language to make the insurance "in force" only
from the date of approval. "[I]nsurers who seek to impose upon words of comId.
I The others were that the policy would cover the period after approval but before issue; that
if the insured became uninsurable between the exam and approval he would still be covered;
4
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mon speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear
the burden of any resulting confusion. '' 6
This is the crucial move in the entire opinion, for two reasons. First, it is
an interpretive move. Hand does not attempt to circumvent the language of the
application, but to make sense of it. Hand was addressing the meaning of the
application, as his invocation of the maxim contra proferentem ("against the
drafter") in support of the assertion just quoted confirms. 7 Second, the particular interpretive route Hand followed hinged not only on the wording in the
application, but also on the fact that the applicant had paid a first premium with
the application: "he would assume that he was getting immediate coverage for
his money." 8
We can see the important relationship between these two points by separating them. Suppose that the language of the application stayed the same, but
the applicant paid no money. Would applicants think that they were covered
from the date of the medical exam, even before paying anything? Perhaps, but
there would be much less justification for doing so. Ordinarily you do not get
something for nothing, although sometimes you do get merchandise now and
receive a bill later. Conversely, suppose that a first premium was paid with the
application, but there was no language stating when coverage would begin.
Would the applicant still assume that he was getting "immediate coverage for
his money?" I doubt it. Very often you pay your money now and the merchandise you are paying for arrives later. Merchandise generally is not legally yours
as soon as you have paid for it, but only once it is sent to you.
So both the language of the application and the payment of a first premium with the application are necessary to Hand's logic. Interestingly, this
logic is completely congruent with what motivates life insurers to promise
backdated coverage when a first premium is paid with the application. And this
congruence, it turns out, is not mere coincidence, but the whole point.
Paying a first premium with the application for life insurance is not just a
sign of the applicant's earnestness. Life insurers are concerned about two other
things that this practice addresses: changes of mind in general and changes of
mind reflecting adverse selection. Like any deposit, payment of a first premium not only signals serious intent, but makes it less likely that the applicant
will act on any change of mind. If a first premium has not been paid, then all
the applicant must do to change his mind is fail to pay the first premium when
the bill arrives from the insurer. On the other hand, once the first premium has
been paid, the insurer has inertia on its side. The applicant who changes his
mind will have to take affirmative steps to secure return of the premium.
More important, consider the likely characteristics of the applicants who
do change their minds. Applicants who change their minds and decide not to
pay when they receive a bill are disproportionately likely to think that they are
at below-average risk and that they do not need the life insurance in question.
Applicants who do not change their minds and decide to pay when they receive
a bill are disproportionately likely to think that they are at above-average risk
6
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and that they do need the life insurance in question. What these two groups of
people think about themselves is more likely to be correct than would be true
merely as a matter of chance. Consequently, applicants who decide to follow
through and pay when billed are likely to pose a higher risk of loss than those
who do not. The life insurer in this situation thus faces the prospect of adverse
selection.
Requiring payment of the first premium with the application can help to
combat this adverse selection, even if the requirement does not entirely eliminate it. Because of the inertia associated with withdrawing the application and
seeking return of the first premium, the group of applicants who do not change
their minds will include a greater proportion of people who do not think that
they are disproportionately at risk than if payment of a first premium were not
required.
But extracting payment of a first premium with the application is not easy,
because it reflects commitment. Asking for only the first monthly or first quarterly premium helps. Inevitably that is less commitment than paying a full
year's premium. More important, the language in the application promising to
backdate coverage if a first premium is paid and the application is approved
gives the agent a selling point - a seemingly reasonable basis for encouraging
the applicant to pay the first premium now. "Pay now and you get back-dated
coverage." The language in the application and the payment of the first premium thus reinforce each other.
But there is a difference between getting backdated coverage and getting
immediate coverage. Hand's interpretation turns the former into the latter.
And here the full significance of that interpretation emerges. The effective
holding in Gaunt is that everyone who files an application promising backdated coverage and pays a first premium with that application has immediate
insurance, subject to divestment by rejection of the application. What the
insurer intends as permanent, retroactive coverage has been transformed into
temporary, prospective coverage that is in force until the application is denied.
Following Hand's statement of this conclusion was his discussion of the
case law.9 This reversal of conventional logic is perhaps at least partly explicable by the fact that there was no precedent on the issue in Connecticut, the state
whose law applied. And the preponderance of precedent from other states was
in doubt. Unaided by precedent, Hand said, he was content to rest the decision
on the reasoning he had already set forth.
B.

Clark's Concurrence

Clark agreed that what had occurred was "unpardonable," and concurred
for that reason. What Hand had called "unpardonable" was the insurer's expectation that an applicant could understand the terms of the application. In contrast, for Clark, what was "unpardonable" was the "course of negotiations
required and controlled by the insurance company."' Clark makes this assertion in the first sentence of his concurrence, but never returns to it. The
unpardonable was presumably the insurer's failure to tell the applicant that he
9 Id. at 602-03.
10 Id. at 603.
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was getting nothing (or almost nothing, and no real coverage) for something the first premium.
The bulk of Clark's opinion is taken up with a different point. He begins
by rejecting Hand's interpretive route to the outcome of the case. Indeed, Clark
as much as acknowledges that the application in Gaunt said what the insurer
contended it said: that actual approval of the application was a condition precedent to coverage. Relying on several classic articles," Clark distinguishes two
forms. The first, like the insurer's application in Gaunt itself, makes approval
of the application a condition precedent to coverage. The second, in contrast,
merely requires satisfaction that the applicant was insurable on the date of the
medical examination. The first form, Clark says, is generally enforced as written, except by a few courts. The second form, of course, creates no problems
for applicants such as Gaunt - he would have been covered under that form.
Yet Clark then indicates that the first form results in continuous litigation,
in a field where certainty is "indispensable."' 2 Basing a decision on interpretation rather than inequity, he concludes, would produce continuing uncertainty.
Notwithstanding the weight of authority against the approach the court takes to
the first form, the absence of Connecticut law clearly on point, he thought,
warranted the court playing a judicial role rather than that of "ventriloquist's
dummy" as to state law, and he therefore concurs in the result.
In one sense, Clark's argument has a distinctly bootstrapping character.
His position gets its force from two sources. The first is the fundamental inequity of the application's terms. The second is the desirability of avoiding litigation, and consequent uncertainty, over the meaning of the first form. Yet Clark
himself recognizes that "few courts ... have found the provision too inequitable to support."' 3 All it would take to avoid the uncertainty with which he is
concerned is for all courts to take the position that his own court rejected in
Gaunt. Now perhaps Clark thought that litigation would persist even in the
face of a clear pro-insurer rule, given the often high stakes and the fact that the
language of each application varies. On this view, he would be correct in saying that "a result placed not squarely on inequity, but upon interpretation,
seems sure to produce continuing uncertainty in the law of insurance contracts."' 4 To the extent that he was relying on this unstated premise, Clark
might - just barely - escape the charge of having used a bootstrapping argument. But bootstrapping or not, the core of his argument ultimately is that the
terms of the application in cases such as Gaunt are inequitable, whether the
outcome of disputes about those terms is certain or not.

II Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Harold C. Havighurst, Comment, Life Insurance Binding
Receipts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 180 (1938); Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance
Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198 (1919); Comment, Operation of Binding Receipts in Life
Insurance, 44 YALE L.J. 1223 (1935).
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ROADS THROUGH INSURANCE LAW

The differences between Hand and Clark reflect a tension that has long run
through insurance law. Hand interpreted, Clark regulated.
It is true that Hand's approach to interpretation was not simplistic or
mechanical. His approach was not literal, or he could not have reached the
result in Gaunt. But Hand was seeking the meaning of the application. For
him this meaning was the product of language in the application that led the
reader in two directions. Hand's job was to determine the dominant direction
and, if necessary, to break a tie with the maxim contraproferentem. No doubt
some courts are aggressive interpreters, while others are passive. In this strand
of insurance law, however, the meaning of the policy language remains the
touchstone of coverage.
Yet at some point aggressive interpretation passes over into regulation.
Clark's contribution in Gaunt was not that he was able to justify his preference
in that case for regulation over interpretation. In fact, what justification there
was of that preference can be found more easily in Hand's opinion than in
Clark's itself. Rather, Clark's contribution lies in his willingness to be entirely
candid about his preference for regulation. In this sense his concurring opinion
was a precursor to the doctrine requiring that the reasonable expectations of the
insured as to coverage be honored, notwithstanding contrary policy language.
The absence of an extended explanation for his position, far from being a weakness, actually serves to underscore the regulatory character of his rationale.
Clark's position is not the product of a search for meaning, but the exercise of
regulatory authority.
Gaunt was by no means the origin of this tension within insurance law
between interpretation and regulation. That tension has existed almost from the
beginning. But this was the dawn of the modem era of insurance law, a time
when the postwar expansion of the American economy would give insurance
significance far beyond what it had previously experienced.
Gaunt is important because it marks one of the points at which the tension
was clearly manifested, in the opinions of two of the most celebrated common
law judges of the twentieth century. It is no surprise, therefore, that more than
fifty years later, the case endures.

